Economic sanctions are a tool governments use to pressure their opponents or protect themselves from attacks. These restrictions on trade, investment, and foreign aid can take many forms and vary in their cost and impact. They can be broad, such as an embargo, or narrowly targeted, such as the freeze of assets at a central bank or a boycott of a country’s products. They can also involve a reduction in military assistance or denial of debt relief. In addition, their effects are influenced by the quality of political institutions in the sanctioned country.
Sanctions have a long history of use. Historically, they were used to complement military action and as a way to punish the enemy economically while avoiding full-scale war. More recently, world leaders have chosen to rely on them when they feel that military options are too massive or diplomatic protest is too meager. Studies suggest that sanctions are effective on average at 31% of the time, and that their success rate is much higher when they target a country’s main export resources.
But little is known about the processes that generate sanctions and how they work. Economists have focused on establishing the causal link between policy and economic outcomes, but often without considering the political goals that drove those policies or the political effects that were expected. The papers in this issue – the result of a conference that brought together economists and political scientists who study sanctions – have helped to shed light on these issues, but there are still many avenues for future research.